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ABSTRACT  
   
This project uses a functional approach to understand how members of 
stigmatized groups perceive emotional expressions on others' faces. The project starts 
from the premise that different groups are seen to pose different threats to others, and 
thus different groups face prejudices colored by different, specific negative emotions. For 
example, prejudice toward Black men is driven largely by fear, whereas prejudice toward 
obese people is driven largely by disgust. Members of these groups may thus come to be 
"expert" in perceiving fear or disgust in others' faces, depending on the specific emotional 
prejudices others feel toward their group. Alternatively, members of these groups may be 
biased to over- or under-perceive these emotional expressions on others' faces. I used a 
functional approach to predict that, if a Black man believes that seeing others' fear 
expressions will be useful to him, he will tend to overperceive fear on others' faces, 
whereas if an obese man believes that seeing others’ disgust expressions will be useful to 
him, he will tend to overperceive disgust on others' faces. If, however, it is not considered 
useful to perceive these prejudicial emotions on others' faces, Black men and obese 
people will tend to underperceive these emotional expressions. This study recruited Black 
men, overweight men, and a group of comparison men.  All participants completed an 
emotion detection task in which they rated faces on whether they expressed fear, disgust, 
or no emotion. Participants were randomly assigned to complete this emotion detection 
task either before or after a questionnaire designed to make salient, as well as to measure, 
participants’ beliefs about others’ prejudices and stereotypes of their group.  Finally, 
participants completed a set of measures tapping predicted moderator variables.  Results 
suggested that a) Black men tend to be less sensitive perceivers of both fear and disgust 
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on others’ faces than are other groups, unless prejudice is salient, and b) variables that 
would guide the functionality of perceiving others’ prejudicial emotional expressions 
(e.g., belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified, belief that group status 
differences are legitimate, belief that one can manage stigmatizing interactions, stigma 
consciousness, and emotion-specific metastereotypes of one’s group) do predict 
differences among Black men in perceiving these emotions on others’ faces.  Most results 
for overweight participants were null findings.  The results’ implications for the 
psychology of detecting prejudice, and emotional expressions more broadly, are 
discussed. 
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As a young Black man in Chicago, Brent Staples became an “expert in the 
language of fear,” noting that passersby huddled closer to each other, avoided eye contact 
with him, and even ran away as he walked down the nighttime street (Staples, 1995).  In 
contrast, an unnamed overweight man (quoted in Lewis, Kravitz, Janssen, & Powell, 
2011) says: “There’s still only three stores for fat people in Melbourne. That says to me 
‘you’re disgusting, you’re fat, it’s all your fault’.” Although like Staples this man 
perceived himself to be the target of prejudice, his words suggest that he became an 
expert not in the language of fear, but of disgust. 
What, exactly, would it look like for members of particular stigmatized groups to 
become “experts” at detecting others’ prejudice?  Would members of different groups 
become, as the quotes above suggest, specially attuned to perceive expressions of not just 
any negative emotion but the specific emotions directed toward their group? Would 
Black men and overweight people become especially accurate at detecting another’s fear 
or disgust, respectively, even when these emotions are only subtly expressed? Might 
members of these groups show biases to either over- or under-perceive these specific 
emotions; that is, would they tend to see fear or disgust even on faces that are not, in fact, 
expressing these emotions?  Or would they err on the side of under-perceiving these 
emotions, only detecting the most obvious expressions of fear or disgust?  
 I propose a functional approach to answer these questions.  I build from a threat- 
and emotion-specific framework for understanding stigma, which argues that targets of 
stigma recognize that the prejudices they face are threat- and emotion-specific and that, 
consequently, they perceive and try to manage others’ prejudices in specific ways. This 
approach rests, fundamentally, on the simple premise that targets’ attunement to 
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particular emotional expressions will reflect the functionality of perceiving those 
emotional expressions; that is, the usefulness of perceiving that someone is afraid of or 
disgusted by them will guide how members of stigmatized groups detect those emotions 
in others. 
 Below, I discuss the threat-specific, affordance-based approach to prejudice and 
to understanding targets’ experience of threat-specific stigmatization, including the 
importance of detecting others’ emotional expressions. Next, I describe the general signal 
detection paradigm and how it helps to answer this project’s central questions.  I then 
propose a set of variables likely to increase or decrease bias at detecting facial 
expressions, and outline my specific predictions.   
An affordance-based perspective 
 This work builds in large part on work exploring how people manage the 
affordances of social life (Gibson, 1979; Johnson & Freeman, 2010; McArthur & Baron, 
1983; Neuberg, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010; Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997; Zebrowitz & 
Monteparte, 2006).  That is, people pose threats and opportunities to each other: We help, 
hurt, nurture, overthrow, undercut, infect, coddle, assist, seduce, and protect each other, 
and we do so discriminately.  Because we are a highly interdependent species, our 
psychology is in many ways designed to assess and predict the threats and opportunities 
others afford us, to facilitate our own social – and ultimately, reproductive – success 
(Buss, 2011).   
 Crucially, affordances are not perceived as static qualities of others.  Rather, they 
emerge dynamically from the way our own goals and abilities intersect with others’ goals 
and abilities: I may perceive my brother to afford me protection – especially when I am 
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concerned for my own safety – whereas you might perceive him to afford harm to you. 
This dynamism means that affordances vary across perceivers, targets, and situations, and 
we are thus flexibly attuned to perceiving both the threats and opportunities specific 
others pose to us (e.g., Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, Blackwell, & Smith, 2005; Kurzban & 
Leary, 2001; Neel, Becker, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2012; Neuberg et al., 2010), as well as 
the threats and opportunities we may pose to others (Cottrell, 2012; Neel, Neufeld, & 
Neuberg, in press; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). 
 The affordance-based perspective reframes how we answer many important 
questions in social psychology, including how people perceive others (Johnson & 
Freeman, 2010; Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997), how alliances form within groups (Cottrell, 
Neuberg, & Li, 2007), and how people manage others’ impressions of them (Neuberg & 
Cottrell, 2008). As discussed below, the origin and course of prejudice, too, look different 
when observed through the lens of affordance management. 
An affordance-based perspective on prejudice 
 Building from an affordance-based perspective, the sociofunctional approach to 
prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000) challenges the 
idea that prejudice is monolithic by describing, instead, qualitatively different 
“syndromes” of prejudice (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012).1   These different syndromes 
become activated when specific groups are perceived to pose one or more specific 
                                                               
1 Research examining being a target of “prejudice” vs. being “stigmatized” is melding as 
it appears that the differences between these literatures do not reflect distinct underlying 
psychologies but simply different research traditions and labels (Phelan, Link, & 
Dovidio, 2008). For this reason, throughout this paper I refer interchangeably to 
“experiencing stigma” and “being a target of prejudice.”  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threats. For example, prejudice toward obese people originates in part from the heuristic 
perception that obese people may spread disease (Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007).  This 
perception produces disgust, which in turn motivates specific behaviors, such as avoiding 
restrooms used by obese people, or washing after shaking hands with them, to minimize 
the threat of contamination.  This particular suite of perceptions, emotions, and behaviors 
evolved to manage health threats in general and has been co-opted and elaborated for the 
social realm (Schaller, 2011).  This suite does not, however, necessarily manage 
perceived threats to one’s safety, property, reciprocity, etc.; these other threats each have 
their own accompanying perceptions, emotions, and behaviors designed, respectively, to 
keep one safe, protect one’s belongings, and maintain equitable social exchange 
networks.  What has traditionally been known as “prejudice” thus encompasses 
qualitatively distinct systems for managing the different kinds of threats people can pose 
to each other. 
Which groups are seen to pose what threats?  
 The stereotype that a group poses a particular threat emerges from an interplay of 
evolved mechanisms with the current cultural environment. For example, perceiving that 
a target poses a violence threat likely emerges from an evolved sensitivity to particular, 
evolutionarily stable cues—such as outgroup maleness (Navarrete, MacDonald, Molina, 
& Sidanius, 2010), large physical size (Fessler, Holbrook, & Snyder, 2012), and rapid 
approach (Miller, Maner, & Becker, 2010)—in combination with mechanisms for 
learning who is likely to pose a threat (e.g., either indirectly, as through stereotypes, or 
directly, through personal experience: Navarette, Olsson, Ho, Mendes, Thomsen, & 
Sidanius, 2009; Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, & Phelps, 2005). Likewise, disease threats are in 
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large part cued by evolutionarily stable signs that a person may bear infectious pathogens.  
One class of such cues encompasses morphological signs that the body has experienced 
infection (e.g., Park, Faulkner & Schaller, 2003; Schaller, 2011).  Other cues may signal 
that the person carries foreign (novel) pathogens and/or may not know the local norms for 
managing infection (Faulkner, Schaller, Park, & Duncan, 2004).  Given the potential 
fitness costs of putting oneself in contact with diseases or of failing to manage or avoid 
violence, both the disease and violence threat detection systems should be calibrated so as 
to risk erring on the side of overperceiving rather than erring on the side of 
underperceiving the presence of these threats; misperceiving as threatening individuals 
who are not, in fact, infectious or violent is generally preferable to misperceiving as safe 
individuals who are, in fact, dangerous; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Neuberg, Kenrick, & 
Schaller, 2011).  Thus, the categories of apparently threatening targets are overinclusive, 
leading people to perceive as threatening some people who do not, in fact, pose such 
threats (e.g., seeing as diseased those with non-infectious facial birthmarks, Ryan, Oaten, 
Stevenson, & Case, in press). 
Who feels vulnerable to these groups’ perceived threats? 
 As predicted by an affordance-based approach, not all people will be equally 
prejudiced toward different groups.  Indeed, some groups may feel or be more vulnerable 
to threats of violence or disease than others, and greater vulnerability – whether measured 
or manipulated – appears to lead to greater prejudice toward groups stereotyped to pose 
those threats.  For example, when in the dark, people who believe the world is a 
dangerous place stereotype Black men as dangerous to a greater extent (Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003); people who are temporarily concerned about disease more readily 
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associate obesity with disease (Park et al., 2007); and incidental disgust increases 
prejudice toward gay men (Dasgupta, Desteno, Williams, & Huntsinger, 2009; Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012).  Likewise, women, who are typically physically weaker than 
men, may be more vulnerable to violence threats in general, and sexual assault threats in 
particular, and thus show greater fear of outgroup men than do men (Navarrete et al., 
2010).  And because men perceive unwanted sexual interest from gay men, whereas 
women do not, men tend to be more prejudiced toward gay men than are women (Pirlott 
& Neuberg, in press).   
Linking perceiver prejudices to target outcomes: Detecting prejudicial emotions  
 To better manage their own outcomes, people who are often targets of threat-
based prejudice would benefit from being prepared to respond to such prejudices.  
Because threat-based prejudices differ in their emotional content, and perhaps emotional 
expressions as well, different target groups may come to be attuned to perceiving specific 
emotional expressions. 
Emotional expressions communicate the affordances others see you to pose. 
Imagine someone looks at you with disgust. What does this communicate to you? To 
what would you attribute that emotion?  Perhaps you would wonder if you had some 
crumbs on your face left over from lunch.  Or perhaps you would assume that the person 
finds what you just said to be morally repugnant or socially unacceptable.  In contrast, if 
someone were to look at you fearfully, you would probably have a very different set of 
intuitions and attributions.  This person thinks that you could harm them – even that you 
were intent on harming them. Emotional expressions may thus communicate perceived 
affordances – when I look afraid of or disgusted by you (or happy about you, proud of 
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you, envious of you, etc.), I am telling you what threats and opportunities I think you 
pose to me. Along these lines, Darwin discussed the communicative nature of different 
emotional expressions across species (1872): “With social animals, the power of 
intercommunication between the members of the same community,—and with other 
species, between the opposite sexes, as well as between the young and the old,—is of the 
highest importance to them” (60). Some contemporary empirical work supports this 
interpretation of emotional expressions as affordance communicators as well.  Emotions 
have social, and not simply intrapersonal, functions (Keltner, Haidt, & Shiota, 2006; 
Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Van Kleef, 2009). Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan, 
and Frank (2008) argue that those functions include communicating information about 
the expresser’s relationship with the target and relationship with the environment, and 
thus expressions are designed to elicit responses from others. Indeed, the featural 
configurations of emotional expressions themselves may have evolved to be easily 
detected by others (Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 2011; Shariff & 
Tracy, 2011), which would facilitate accurate detection of how others perceive and 
respond to you when they express emotions to you. Below, I discuss what is known about 
the elicitors of fear and disgust, what people might infer when others are afraid of or 
disgusted by them, and how people might respond.  
 Fear. People feel fear when they perceive a threat to their physical safety, 
motivating safety-seeking and escape from the threat and defense against attack.  For 
example, one might feel fear when another person acts dominantly and aggressively to 
maintain control and status. Fear expressions appear to serve especially important 
functions within status hierarchies. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) argue that experiencing 
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fear “estimates the cost of challenging superiors” (p. 168), and thus the fear expression 
conveys that the expresser expects the other person to act dominantly.  Being feared, in 
turn, confers dominance, raising one’s status and access to resources (Cheng, Tracy, 
Foulsham, Kinsgstone, & Henrich, 2013; Henrich, & Gil-White, 2001). Thus, when 
people are afraid of you, their expressions communicate an implicit power dynamic in 
which you are seen as seeking dominance over them and as capable of harming others 
(see also Ohman, 1986). Indeed, fear expressions themselves may have evolved not only 
as general signals to alert others to possible threat, but when directed at a possible 
aggressor, to attempt appeasement (Shariff & Tracy, 2011).  The morphology of the fear 
expression reflects this latter function, and may be designed to signal lower power and 
submission in an attempt to appease the target of the expression and thereby reduce 
aggression from him or her (Marsh, Ambady, & Kleck, 2005). 
Disgust 
 Disgust expressions, in contrast, signal a very different set of perceived 
affordances. Seeing that someone is disgusted by you is a sign that you are perceived in 
some way as “dirty” and as a potential contaminant to others’ health or morality (Oaten, 
Stevenson, & Case, 2009; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008; Tybur, Lieberman, & 
Griskevicius, 2009; Tybur, Lieberman, Kurzban, & DeScioli, 2013). Shariff and Tracy 
(2011) hypothesize that the disgust expression serves to warn others about aversive 
foods, and distasteful ideas and behaviors. Another’s disgust expression may also 
communicate that the expresser sees you as lower in status or power:  Many creatures 
relegate individuals bearing sickness cues to the bottom of a hierarchy (e.g., Wilson, 
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1975), including chimpanzees (e.g., Van Lawick-Goodall, 1971), and especially if disgust 
is accompanied by contempt (e.g., Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).  
Stigmatized groups perceive threat- and emotion-specific prejudice 
 The current project focuses on two target groups—Black men, stereotyped to be 
violent and targeted with fear-based prejudice (Duncan, 1976; Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & 
Davies, 2004; Navarrete, McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010; Schaller et al., 2003; 
Trawalter, Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008), and obese people, stereotyped in part to pose 
disease threats and targeted with disgust-based prejudice (Park et al., 2007; Vartanian, 
2010). Members of these groups believe prejudice is threat/emotion specific (Neel et al., 
2013), and these beliefs may mediate the effects of threat-specific prejudice on their own 
outcomes – as when, for example, obese people perceive that others are disgusted by, but 
not afraid of, them, and that this belief motivates subsequent threat-management 
behaviors.  Framed another way, I propose that targets’ “meta-stereotypes” – that is, 
targets’ beliefs about how their group is stereotyped by others (Vorauer, Main, & 
O'Connell, 1998) – are threat- and emotion-specific. 2  
There is some evidence for this. In parallel with findings that Blacks are 
stereotyped as dangerous, a representative survey of Black Americans from the mid-
1990’s found “dangerousness” to be the most widely-held metastereotype of Blacks – 
more common than metastereotypes of lack of intelligence (Sigelman & Tuch, 1997). 
                                                               
2 Prejudices toward both obese people and Black men may include anger and contempt, 
and thus members of both groups may become attuned to these expressions in addition to 
disgust or fear, respectively.  However, examining prejudicial emotions different across 
the two groups allows for stronger tests of my predictions, and so this investigation 
begins there.  Follow-up research can examine prejudice-tinged emotional expressions 
common to both groups. 
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Likewise, some evidence suggests that targets of disease- and disgust-based prejudice 
also have threat-specific metastereotypes: Puhl, Moss-Racusin, Schwartz, and Brownell 
(2007) found that a substantial proportion of an overweight and obese sample mentioned 
“poor hygiene” as a common weight-based stereotype, and Smith and colleagues (2007) 
report that colostomy patients perceive disgust to be a significant component of anti-
colostomy stigma. When explicitly asked about the threats their group is seen to pose to 
others, obese people say that others perceive that they are a health threat (but not a 
physical safety threat) and feel disgust (but not fear) toward them, whereas Black men 
perceive physical safety to be the threat their group is most seen to pose and that others 
fear them (Neel et al., in press). This specificity in threat-perception is reflected in 
experiences of discrimination as well.  In one study (Kessler, Mickelson, & Williams, 
1999, cited in Keyes, 2009), one of the most common discrimination experiences 
reported by Black Americans was having been hassled by police in their lifetime, with 
19.3% reporting this (compared to 4.2% of White Americans), and fully 33.3% of Black 
Americans reported that “people act as if they are afraid of you” at least “sometime” or 
“very often” on a daily basis (compared to only 7.2 % of White Americans).  Thus, 
targets appear to perceive both the prejudices and discrimination they face to be threat-
specific.  
 Furthermore, targets of prejudice may expect fear- or disgust-based prejudice 
from some groups more than others.  As discussed above, groups who tend to be or feel 
most vulnerable to specific threats are more prejudiced toward groups seen to pose those 
threats.  Given this, Black men might expect fear from White women more than from 
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White men.  Thus, targets may be especially attuned to signs of emotion-specific 
prejudice coming from particular others. 
A functional approach to emotion detection 
 If different stigmatized targets are subject to different forms of prejudice, one 
might expect all targets to become “super-attuned” to the specific emotions others often 
feel toward them.  For example, one might expect Black men to be highly accurate at 
detecting fear expressions, whereas obese individuals would be highly accurate at 
detecting disgust expressions. However, given the nuances suggested by an affordance-
based approach to emotion detection, this prediction is likely too simple.  Instead, 
perceiving that someone is fearful of or disgusted by you should be guided by the extent 
to which that information is useful to you in some way.  That is, targets’ tendency to 
detect others’ disgust or fear is likely to be specific to the extent that such specificity 
helps the target respond to or manage the effects of others’ prejudice. Below, I outline a 
signal detection approach to detecting others’ fear and disgust expressions, and then 
elaborate specific predictions for different targets’ attunement to these expressions. 
 As discussed above, members of stigmatized groups may frequently encounter 
others’ specific, threat-relevant expressions of disgust, fear, pity, or anger, etc.  However, 
targets may confront situations in which it is not overwhelmingly clear whether or not 
someone is afraid of or disgusted by them: Is that person disgusted by me or by 
something else? Is she, in fact, not expressing disgust at all?  
 Signal Detection Theory (Macmillan & Creelman, 1990; Swets, Tanner, & 
Birdsall, 1961; Tanner & Swets, 1954) provides a framework for exploring such cases of 
perceptual ambiguity, and we can employ it to better understand how targets of prejudice 
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might attune their detection of particular emotional expressions.  To the extent that a 
person tends to make accurate judgments about whether or not someone is expressing a 
particular emotion, she can be considered to have good sensitivity in detecting that 
emotional expression – in discriminating those times when that expression is present 
from when it is absent. However, there is also the possibility of certain kinds of 
systematic response biases:  She may be biased towards perceiving a particular emotion 
even when it is, in fact, not expressed (“false alarms”), or she may be biased towards 
failing to perceive a particular emotion that is, in fact, expressed (“misses”); also see 
Error Management Theory (Haselton & Nettle, 2006).  Note that sensitivity and response 
bias are separable cognitive phenomena: A person can exhibit an extreme response bias – 
for example, to never say that someone is disgusted by her – that will produce poor 
sensitivity if people are often disgusted by her, yet perfect sensitivity if people are indeed 
never disgusted by her.  
 Response biases in perceiving emotional expressions 
 In perceiving others’ emotional expressions, targets may develop one of two 
possible response biases: a bias to minimize misses (e.g., erring on the side of detecting 
all instances of an expression, with the implication of “seeing” the expression when it 
isn’t there), or a bias to minimize false alarms (e.g., erring on the side of only detecting 
actual expressions of an emotion, with the implication of missing some actual 
expressions of the emotion).  Which of these biases targets adopt depends on the relative 
costs of these two errors.  For example, a smoke detector is calibrated to err on the side of 
responding as though there is fire, producing numerous annoying but not very costly false 
alarms, in order to minimize the quite costly mistake of failing to detect actual fire 
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(Nesse, 2001).  Likewise, for circumstances in which it is less costly to see a threat-
relevant emotional expression when there was none than to miss an actual threat-relevant 
emotional expression, targets should develop a bias to minimize misses: risking the 
perception of emotional expressions where they did not occur in the service of not 
missing actual emotional expressions when they do appear.  Such a strategy could be 
favored if the target is motivated to change or respond to others’ emotional expressions, 
if the costs of misapplying that strategy are low, and/or if the actual rate of true emotional 
expression is quite high (so the frequency of misperceiving an expression as present 
would be very low).  For example, if a Black man is concerned that others fear him (e.g., 
he anticipates fear-based prejudice in an intergroup interaction), is motivated to change 
that perception, perceives that doing so is possible (e.g., he believes that if he smiles 
others will perceive him not to be a threat), and the costs of misapplying that strategy to 
people who are not in fact afraid of him are low (e.g., when smiling at people who are not 
afraid of him has no great cost), he will likely be biased to perceive that others are afraid 
of him (and consequently smile more often) than might be otherwise “necessary” to make 
the interaction go smoothly.   
Targets may also adopt a bias to minimize misses when their stigmatized 
characteristics are particularly socially unacceptable and the discrimination they face 
severe, so that the cost of missing an actual threat-relevant expression — and thereby 
missing an opportunity to respond to it — outweighs the cost of misperceiving the 
expression when it is not there. Children who have been physically abused show such a 
bias not to miss expressions of anger, but not other negative emotions (Pollak, Cicchetti, 
Hornung, & Reed, 2000) – presumably because the costs for them of missing an adult’s 
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anger (and thereby failing to adopt appeasement or escape behaviors, increasing the risk 
of physical injury) outweigh the costs of falsely perceiving anger when it did not appear 
(and thereby avoiding or appeasing someone who does not intend to hurt them). 
 In contrast, when targets perceive that they have little control over the course of 
their stigma (e.g., they cannot change their stigmatizing mark) or little ability to 
effectively manage others’ responses to their stigma, they may adopt more conservative 
biases to minimize false alarms and, as a consequence, they may under-perceive actual 
expressions of an emotion.  In these cases, the costs of falsely perceiving others to 
express the particular emotion are greater than the costs of missing an actual emotional 
expression.  For example, a Black man who can do nothing to change his race, and 
believes that others will respond to him the same way regardless of how he presents 
himself, may be biased to under-perceive that others are afraid of him, because the 
benefit of perceiving that others are frightened of him may be low, and even 
psychologically costly (e.g., reminders of his stigmatized status may be demoralizing 
when he believes there is nothing he can do to change that).  
Primary hypotheses: 
H1. Black men will show a bias to over-perceive fear (identifying neutral faces as 
fearful). 
H1ab. The bias described in H1 will be especially present a) when 
stereotypes/prejudices are made salient, and b) when the expresser is a woman.3 
                                                               
3 This should be especially true for non-Black expressers; the proposed study will use 
White expresser faces, and follow-up studies can examine this supplementary hypothesis 
directly by comparing Black men’s detection of fear on Black vs. White faces. 
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H2. Obese men will show a bias to over-perceive disgust (identifying neutral faces as 
disgusted).  
H2a. The bias described in H2 will be especially present a) when 
stereotypes/prejudices are made salient.  I predict that this overperception of 
disgust will be similarly large for male and female faces, because both men and 
women are vulnerable to disease threats and likely to be prejudiced toward obese 
people. 
Overview of hypothesized moderators of response bias in detecting prejudice-
relevant emotional expressions 
 As discussed above, the extent to which targets of prejudice over- or under-
perceive others’ prejudice-related expressions should depend on the extent to which they 
perceive that expressive information will be useful to them. Thus, a number of individual 
difference factors (including those mentioned above) may contribute to the psychological 
calculus of whether it is better to over- or under-perceive others’ expressions, and 
moderate participants’ response biases.  First, to the extent that targets are motivated to 
manage others’ prejudice (or that they hold beliefs contributing to this motivation), they 
should over-perceive fear or disgust on others’ faces because perceiving this expression 
would be a first step in identifying and then managing others’ prejudice. Second, to the 
extent that targets perceive the costs of missing an actual expression to be high, they 
should also show a bias to over-perceive fear or disgust, because this would minimize 
misses of the expression when it does appear. Third, to the extent that targets believe 
stigma-tinged situations can be managed, they should over-perceive fear or disgust on 
other’s faces because this information will be useful to them in addressing the situation. 
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 In contrast, to the extent that each of these factors is low – that is, targets are not 
motivated to manage others’ prejudice, they perceive the costs of missing an actual 
expression to be low, or they believe stigma-tinged situations cannot be managed, targets 
should be biased to under-perceive prejudice-relevant expressions on others’ faces.    
Secondary hypotheses: 
The following factors will positively predict targets’ bias to over-perceive the specific 
emotional expression of prejudice toward their group: 
H3. Motivation to manage others’ prejudice and beliefs that contribute to this motivation: 
H3a. Motivation to manage others' prejudice 
H3b. Belief that stigma-tinged situations can be managed 
H3c. Belief that others' prejudice can change 
H3d. Belief that prejudice is unjust 
H4. High perceived cost of missing an actual expression 
H4a. Belief that the stigmatized condition/cue/group membership is socially 
unacceptable 
H4b. Belief that discrimination is potentially severe 
H5. Belief that stigma-tinged situations can be managed 
Method 
Participants 
 Recruitment. Participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mturk website, 
which allows researchers to pay online “workers” a small sum to participate in studies.  I 
originally estimated that screening 3,000 participants would provide >150 overweight 
men and 150 black men in the final sample.  As noted below, the number of Black men 
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participating in the pre-screening was below this estimate (instead of 5%, the percentage 
of Black men in the prescreen was < 2%), leading to a smaller final sample of Black men. 
 Pre-screening. A pre-screening survey was opened to Mturk Workers from the 
United States who had at least an 85% acceptance rate for Mturk work, meaning that no 
more than 15% of the tasks participants had done on Mturk (which include studies) had 
been rejected for poor quality; setting some standard for acceptance rate helps to ensure 
that participants are paying attention to the study. This pre-screening included questions 
about the participant’s sex, race, whether the person is very overweight for their height or 
not, weight and height, embedded among other questions. Eligible participants were 
immediately forwarded to the focal study.  
 Participant compensation. For participants in the pilot run of the study, the 
initial pre-screening survey paid 50 cents and the focal study paid a bonus of $1.50. For 
participants in the primary run of the study, the initial pre-screening survey paid 70 cents 
and the focal study paid a bonus of $1.50. 
 Participant sample. 
 Participant selection. 213 people participated in a pilot run of the prescreening 
and focal study (all participants in the pilot’s prescreening were forwarded to the focal 
study).  For the primary run of the study, 3,238 people participated in the prescreening, 
and all participants who were African American men (but not overweight), or overweight 
men (but not African American) were forwarded on to the focal study.  To create a 
comparison group (in addition to participants from the pilot study), the last 354 
participants in the primary run were given the option to participate in the focal study as 
well as the pre-screening; those men who were not African American or overweight were 
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randomly assigned to either the African American or overweight versions of the study.  
Recruitment for the comparison group was started after the study had begun because 
initially I only planned to recruit Black or overweight men to the study, but decided 
partway through that a comparison group would be useful for testing hypotheses.
 Exclusion criteria. Twelve cases for which there was evidence that the participant 
had already completed the study (either by completing both the pilot and primary runs of 
the study – identified with Mturk ID - or by completing the study multiple times from the 
same IP address in quick succession) were removed from the dataset (in each instance, 
the participant’s second case was removed).  I also calculated each participant’s standard 
deviation of responses in the emotion detection task; a standard deviation of 0 would 
show that a participant’s face judgments had no variability.  However, no participant had 
a standard deviation of 0 (they ranged from .68 to 2.46), and thus all cases were retained 
for analyses.  Finally, participants who were Native American were not included in the 
final sample (because all participants answered questions about prejudices toward and 
stereotypes of Native Americans). 
 Final participant groups. 
 Black men. A total of 64 Black men (indicating “African/African American” in 
the pre-screening) participated. Because of the small number of Black men in the 
participant pool (< 2%), after the study had begun the criteria were changed so that Black 
men who are overweight could participate in the version of the study for Black men.4 In 
                                                               
4 Including overweight Black men is a risk to the extent that a) their being overweight 
leads them to have a baseline psychology of perceiving emotions that is similar to other 
overweight men (e.g., overperceiving disgust), or that b) being an overweight Black man 
leads one to be subjected to qualitatively different prejudices and stereotypes than non-
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addition, those overweight Black men who had already completed the pre-screening were 
sent an email invitation to participate in the main study, and 5 chose to do so, for a total 
of 14 overweight Black men in the sample. The mean age of all Black male participants 
was 27 years (SD = 7.6 years). Participants’ Body Mass Index (BMI) was calculated from 
self-report height and weight. Black men’s average BMI was 25.7 (SD = 6.5), putting 
them in the overweight range (between 25 and 29.9).  The 14 overweight Black men were 
on average 26 years old (SD = 6.7 years) and had an average BMI of 35.7 (SD = 3.9), 
indicating that the majority of the overweight Black men are obese (> 30). 
 Overweight men. A total of 187 overweight men participated.  The mean age of 
these participants was 33 years (SD = 10.6 years); 12 were Asian/Asian American, 8 
were Latino/Hispanic, and 167 were Caucasian/White. Overweight men reported a mean 
BMI of 33.7 (SD = 6.4), indicating that a majority of participants in this group are obese 
(BMI > 30). 
 Comparison group men. A total of 138 men who were neither overweight nor 
African American formed the comparison group. The mean age of these participants was 
31 years (SD = 11.7 years), and their average BMI was 24.7 (SD = 3.43), putting them 
just in the normal range (between 18 and 24.9). 11 were Asian/Asian American, 12 were 
Latino/Hispanic, 2 were Middle Eastern, 108 were Caucasian/White, and 5 were of 
another race/ethnicity. 
Design Overview 
 Participants rated their confidence in whether each face expressed fear, no 
emotion, or disgust. The faces expressed no emotion, to 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, or                                                                                                                                                                                            
overweight Black men (e.g., perhaps people are afraid of non-overweight Black men, but 
not obese Black men).  These possibilities will be expanded upon in the Discussion.  
  20 
60% disgust or fear.  Participants completed these judgments either before or after a 
stereotype/prejudice salience manipulation designed to make salient their own beliefs 
about the specific emotions others feel toward their group (or for comparison group men, 
their own beliefs about the specific emotions others feel toward either obese people or 
African Americans).  Thus, the study had a 3 (participant group [Black, overweight, 
comparison]; between-subjects) X 2 (prejudice salience [yes, no]; between-subjects) X 2 
(expresser gender [male, female]; within-subjects) X 13 (expression percentage morph: 
10% disgust, 20% disgust, etc. up to 60% disgust; 10% fear, 20% fear, etc. up to 60% 
fear; and neutral; within-subjects) design. 
Materials and measures 
 Facial expression stimuli. Expresser images were taken from the Radboud face 
database (Langner, Dotsch, Bijlstra, Wigboldus, Hawk, & van Knippenberg, 2010), 
which includes White posers expressing disgust, fear, and neutrality. 
 Face morph stimuli creation. Fantamorph 5.3.6. software was used to create 
target images that varied in the extent to which they expressed fear or disgust.  For 
example, to create the disgust morphs for a particular expresser, the neutral and disgusted 
images for the expresser were loaded into the program.  Dots were placed on 
corresponding facial areas of the two images.  Using the program’s morphing tools, I 
created faces that were 10% disgusted, 20% disgusted, etc., up to 90% disgusted.  I then 
repeated the process using the expresser’s neutral and fearful images to create fear 
morphs ranging from 10-90%.  Disgust and fear face morphs were created for 10 male 
expressers and 10 female expressers. 
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 Expresser selection.  Pre-ratings of the target faces were gathered a) to ensure 
that there was sufficient variability in the judgments of targets at lower level morphs (i.e., 
30% disgust/fear), b) to examine whether the 50% or 60% morphs were sufficiently clear 
in expressing disgust and fear (and thus could serve as the most extreme morph in the 
main sample), and c) to provide ratings from which to choose the 6 targets for the main 
study that were sufficiently equivalent in clearly expressing disgust and fear at the 
different morph levels. A group of 8 research assistants (7 female, 1 male; 1 Asian 
American, 7 White; 1 overweight, 7 non-overweight) rated the 10%, 30%, 50%, and 60% 
morphs for the 20 expressers.  For each image, the research assistants responded to the 
question, “Is this face expressing fear, no emotion, or disgust?” with response options of 
definitely fear (1), probably fear (2), possibly fear (3), no emotion (4), possibly disgust 
(5), probably disgust (6), or definitely disgust (7).  The research assistants’ average 
ratings were used to choose 3 male and 3 female faces that were as close as possible in 
clearly expressing disgust and fear.  Average emotion ratings of the final 6 faces in the 
dataset are presented in Table 1.  All six expressers are shown in Figure 1, and a sample 
of all morphs for one expresser is presented in Figure 2. 
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Table 1. Pre-ratings of emotions on the faces of the 6 expressers selected for use in the 
Emotion Expression Task (1=definitely fear, 4=no emotion, 7=definitely disgust). 




morph M SD 
10% 3.94 0.22 
30% 3.10 0.72 
50% 1.82 0.73 
Fear 
60% 1.27 0.65 
10% 4.13 0.25 
30% 5.25 1.08 
50% 6.58 0.63 
Disgust 
60% 6.67 0.61 
 




Figure 1. Neutral images of the six expressers chosen for inclusion in Emotion 
Identification Task. 
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Figure 2. Full set of emotion detection task target images for one (of six) expressers. 
Morphs ranging from 10-60% of fear or disgust were presented to participants, as well as 
the original neutral face.  
 




Stereotype/prejudice salience manipulation. A series of items asked 
participants how people in general perceive two different groups (for all participants, the 
first group was Native Americans; for Black men or obese men, the second of these 
groups was their own: African Americans or obese people), including what specific 
emotions others tend to feel toward their group (adapted from Neel et al., in press).  For 
example, “when most people think about obese people, in general, they feel [negative 
towards them/frightened of them/grossed out by them],” anchored at 1 = not at all and 9 
= extremely. (See Appendix A for full set of items) 
 Individual difference measures.  A series of measures tapped the proposed 
moderators (see Appendices B-D for all items). Measures that did not explicitly mention 
prejudice were administered as part of the pre-screening (specifically, items measuring: 
Beliefs that the world is just, Protestant Work Ethic, and Legitimizing Beliefs).  Measures 
that mentioned prejudice were administered at the end of the focal study (all other 
measures). 
A) Participants’ motivation to manage others’ prejudice toward their group. E.g., "It is 
important to me that others not be prejudiced toward me" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree).  
B) Participants’ belief that stigma-tinged interactions can be managed. E.g., "When 
someone is prejudiced toward me, there are things that I can do to make the situation 
better for myself" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
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C) Participants’ belief that a person’s prejudice can change (items adapted from Neel & 
Shapiro, 2012, to be specific to prejudice toward obese people and Black people).  E.g., 
"If a person is prejudiced toward obese/Black people, there isn't much that can be done to 
change their feelings." (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree).  
D) Participants’ belief that prejudice toward their group is just/unjust.  E.g., “Prejudice 
toward [Black people/obese people] is wrong” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). In addition, general beliefs that the world is just and other “legitimizing 
ideologies” were measured as part of the pre-screening (from O’Brien & Major, 2005).  
E) The perceived social acceptability of prejudice toward the participant’s group. E.g., 
“most people think it is OK hold prejudices toward [Black people/ obese people]” (1 = 
strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree).  
F) The perceived severity of discrimination toward oneself on the basis of race/weight.  
E.g., “If someone were to discriminate against me based on my [race/weight], that would 
have negative social consequences for me;” “It would be stressful for me to be a target of 
someone’s prejudice based on my [race/weight]” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). 
 Demographic measures.  Basic demographic information was collected, 
including the participant’s age, race, sex, political orientation, religious orientation, state 
and zip code, educational attainment, subjective SES, and yearly income. Participants 
also reported whether they used a smartphone, tablet, laptop, or desktop device to 
complete the study. 
Procedure 
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 Cover story. The study was advertised as “Perceptions of People.” Participants 
were told that the researchers are interested in two aspects of how people perceive others: 
How most people perceive different groups in society, and how different emotions on 
faces are perceived. 
 Emotional expression detection task.  For each trial in the emotion detection 
task, the target face was programmed to be presented for 2000 milliseconds.  However, 
because of variability in the speed of loading the pictures, some participants saw the 
images for less than 2000 milliseconds, and several participants noted in the study 
comments section that they did not see some images at all.  Thus, the actual presentation 
time of each face ranged from 0 to 2000 ms. Unfortunately, there is no record of how 
long each face was actually presented.  Note that the noise introduced by the truncated 
presentation time should be randomly distributed across faces, but could be non-
randomly distributed across participants (e.g., if due to a slower internet connection 
speed). If there is no reason to think, a priori, that overweight vs. Black vs. comparison 
men on Mturk would have different internet connection speeds, then slow-internet 
participants should be distributed equally across groups.  However, even if there is no 
systematic relationship between participant group and internet speed, a group with a 
small N (e.g., the Black men prejudice-salience and no-salience conditions) may be more 
vulnerable to having their group mean distorted by a few participants who didn’t get to 
see the faces and responded in a systematic way. 
 For each face, participants responded to the question, “Is this face expressing fear, 
no emotion, or disgust?” with a response of definitely fear (1), probably fear (2), possibly 
fear (3), no emotion (4), possibly disgust (5), probably disgust (6), or definitely disgust 
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(7).  These response options appeared with the face and remained on the screen until the 
participant advanced to the next question. 
 The order in which the faces appeared was randomized for each participant.   
 Prejudice salience manipulation. According to condition, participants 
completed the prejudice salience manipulation either before or after the emotional 
expression detection task.  Before completing these items, participants saw ten groups 
listed on the screen and were told that they would be answering questions about two 
groups randomly chosen from the list.  In fact, all participants completed the items in 
reference to Native Americans, and then in reference to obese people or African 
Americans, according to group membership (or for other participants not in these groups, 
random assignment). 
 Individual differences, demographic measures, and debriefing. Next, 
participants completed the individual difference measures not administered during the 
pre-screening.  In keeping with the cover story, the questions were presented first in 
reference to Native Americans, and then in reference to either African Americans / Black 
people, or obese people, according to condition. Then, participants completed a few 
questions to assess suspicion (e.g., “What do you think of the study so far?”  “What do 
you think the study is about?” and “Did anything about the study seem strange or 
unusual?”). No participants guessed the study hypotheses (that different groups would 
differently perceive fear or disgust), and no participants were excluded based on their 
responses to the suspicion probe items. Finally, participants were debriefed. 
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Results 
Summary of dependent variables 
 Several different dependent variables can be produced from these data.  First, for 
any group, ratings of neutral faces enable us to test for any bias to call neutral faces 
disgusted or fearful. Second, ratings of disgusted/fearful morphs provide evidence of 
participant’s confidence that the target emotion was displayed (definitely fear, probably 
fear, possibly fear, etc.). Third, participant sensitivity (accuracy) and response bias in 
perceiving disgust or fear on a face can be computed by transforming responses into hits 
vs. misses for a particular emotion (Wickens, 2002; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).  For 
example, for disgusted faces, I counted any rating of 5 (possibly disgust) through 7 
(definitely disgust) as a hit, whereas I counted any rating of 1 (definitely fear) through 4 
(no emotion) as a miss.  Rating a neutral face as disgusted – again, any rating of 5 
(possibly disgust) through 7 (definitely disgust) – was counted as a false alarm, whereas 
any rating of 1 (definitely fear) through 4 (no emotion) was counted as a correct rejection 
of disgust.  To calculate sensitivity (d’), I subtracted the probit values of false alarms 
from the probit values of hits (probit is an acceptable substitute for Z-scores in these 
models; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). Greater d’ values indicate greater sensitivity in 
identifying fear or disgust as present or absent.  To calculate response bias (c) I summed 
the probit values of the hits and false alarms for that type of face, and divided by 2. 
Positive values of c indicate a tendency to identify a face as disgusted/fearful whereas 
negative values of c indicate a tendency to identify a face as neutral. Unless otherwise 
indicated, values of c (bias to call a face disgusted/fearful) are calculated using hit rates 
across percentage morphs of a particular face type (e.g., all disgusted face morphs/all 
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fearful face morphs) and false alarms for all neutral faces (i.e., calling a neutral face 
disgusted/calling a neutral face fearful).  Because values of 0 and 1 cannot be used in the 
formulas for d’ and c, these were replaced with other values in accordance with accepted 
standards (1/2 of the distance between the otherwise lowest and highest possible values, 
or .084 and .916; Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985). 
Prediction 1: Black men are expected to show a bias to over-perceive fear on others’ 
faces, whereas overweight men show a bias to over-perceive disgust (H1 & H2) 
 For the following analyses, I examined only those participants for whom 
prejudice was not salient, to examine base rates of perceiving fear and disgust in faces. 
 I first examined the evidence for this prediction by running an ANOVA with 
group (Black men, overweight men, comparison men) as a between-subjects factor, on 
the ratings participants gave to neutral faces.  There were no significant differences 
between the groups, F (2, 211) = 1.54, p = .22, ηp2 = .01: Black men M = 4.00, SD = .18, 
overweight men M = 4.04, SD = .17, comparison men M = 4.07, SD = .22.  Overall, 
then, very few neutral faces were rated as anything other than neutral, and there was no 
evidence that the groups differently tend to project fear or disgust onto neutral faces. 
 I next examined the evidence for this prediction using a 3 (group: Black men, 
overweight men, comparison men) X 2 (emotion: disgust, fear) Mixed ANOVA on scores 
of c (bias).  If Black men overperceive fear and overweight men overperceive disgust, 
then Black men should show positive bias scores for fear judgments, and overweight men 
should show positive bias scores for disgust judgments, resulting in an interaction 
between group and emotion. The predicted interaction of group with emotion did not 
emerge, F (2, 211) = 1.47, p = .23, ηp2 = .01. There was a main effect of emotion F(1, 
  31 
211) = 41.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .17, with stronger bias across groups to call fearful faces 
neutral (M = -.50, SD = .22) than to call disgusted faces neutral (M = -.35, SD = .28).  
There was also a main effect of group, F(2, 211) = 6.99, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, with 
comparison men showing a significantly weaker bias to call fearful and disgusted faces 
neutral (M = -.36, SD = .22) than did either Black men (M = -.50, SD = .19; t(106) = 
3.17, p = .002) or overweight men (M = -.44, SD = .17; t(176) = 2.73, p = .007).  In other 
words, Black men and overweight men were more conservative in their bias to call a face 
fearful or disgusted than were comparison men. Black men and overweight men’s biases 
did not differ, t(140) = 1.70, p = .09. 
 Finally, I examined the evidence for this prediction by running 3 (group: Black 
men, overweight men, comparison men) X 6 (percent morph: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60) 
Mixed ANOVAs on confidence in judging fearful faces, and then on confidence in 
judging disgusted faces (see Figures 3 and 4).  If Black men overperceive fear on faces, 
or are more confident that a fearful face is fearful, then we should see that their ratings 
were lower than other groups in judging fearful faces (recall that fear ratings occupied the 
lower end of the response scale).  Although the main effect of group was significant, F(2, 
211) = 9.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, Black men in fact gave higher ratings to fearful faces 
(indicating less confident ratings of fear; M = 3.18, SD = .63) than did overweight men 
(M = 2.86, SD = .39; t(140) = 3.57, p = .007) or comparison men (M = 2.80, SD = .40; 
t(106) = 3.31, p = .002).  Overweight men’s and comparison men’s ratings did not differ 
from each other, t(176) = 1.07, p = .29.  In addition, a significant interaction of percent 
morph with group indicates that this main effect of group differed between the various 
percent morph levels, F(10, 1055) = 4.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .04.  Examining simple effects 
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tests shows that the pattern reflected in the main effect emerges for those morphs at 30% 
or greater (ps < .01), but not at morphs of 10% or 20% (ps > .23).  For no percent morph 
did overweight men’s ratings of fear differ from comparison men’s ratings, all ps > .18. 
Thus, Black men were overall less confident than were overweight and comparison men 
in judging faces as fearful, and this pattern emerged for faces that were more obviously 
fearful, rather than very subtly expressing fear.   
 If overweight men are more confident that a disgusted face is disgusted, then we 
should see that their ratings were higher overall in judging disgust (because disgust 
ratings occupied the higher end of the response scale). Although the main effect of group 
was significant, F(2, 211) = 7.88, p = .001, ηp2 = .07, overweight men in fact gave lower 
ratings to disgusted faces (indicating less confident ratings of disgust; M = 5.39, SD = 
.38) than did comparison men (M = 5.52, SD = .42; t(176) = 2.38, p = .02).  Black men 
gave significantly lower ratings of disgust (M = 5.19, SD = .46) than did both 
comparison men (t(106) = 3.69, p < .001) and overweight men (t(140) = 2.34, p = .02). In 
addition, a significant interaction of percent morph with group indicates that this main 
effect of group differed between the various percent morph levels, F(10, 1055) = 5.00, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .05.  Examining simple effects tests shows that Black men’s ratings differed 
from comparison men’s ratings for those morphs at 30% or greater (ps < .03), but not at 
morphs of 10% or 20% (ps > .09). Overweight men’s ratings differed from comparison 
men’s ratings for those morphs at 20% and 30% (ps < .03), but not at other morph 
percentages (ps > .05).  Thus, as with their confidence that a face expressed fear, Black 
men were less confident that faces expressed disgust, and this was apparent for faces that 
were more extreme in their expressions.  Overweight men, in contrast, were less 
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confident than comparison group men that a face was disgusted, but only when the 
disgust expression was relatively subtle. 
 In sum, there was no evidence to support Prediction 1.  The ratings of neutral 
faces produced no evidence of group differences (this was the case across all analyses, 
and so neutral face ratings will be discussed no further).  Analyses of bias (c) show that 
Black men and overweight men were less likely to call a face either fearful or disgusted 
than were comparison group men.  And finally, compared to the comparison men, Black 
men gave less confident judgments of both fear and disgust, and overweight men gave 
less confident judgments of disgust (though not fear).  This suggests that, at baseline, 
Black men may be less likely than other men to identify as fearful or disgusted a 
somewhat fearful or disgusted face, and overweight men may be less likely to call a 
disgusted face disgusted. 
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of fearful faces, with standard error bars, for participants in the no 
salience condition.





Figure 4. Mean ratings of disgusted faces, with standard error bars, for participants in the 
no salience condition. 





Prediction 2. Black men’s bias to detect fear and overweight men’s bias to detect 
disgust are especially pronounced when prejudice/stereotypes of their group are 
salient (H1a & H2a) 
 To test this prediction, I conducted the same analyses described above (for c and 
for ratings of disgust/fear) on the responses of those participants for whom prejudice was 
salient.   
 I examined the evidence for this prediction using a 3 (group: Black men, 
overweight men, comparison men) X 2 (emotion: disgust, fear) Mixed ANOVA on scores 
of c (bias).  As before, if Black men overperceive fear and overweight men overperceive 
disgust, then Black men should show positive bias scores for fear judgments, and 
overweight men should show positive bias scores for disgust judgments, resulting in an 
interaction between group and emotion. The predicted interaction of group with emotion 
did not emerge, F (2, 172) = 1.24, p = .29, ηp2 = .01. There was a main effect of emotion 
F(1, 172) = 37.06, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, with stronger bias across groups to call fearful 
faces neutral (M = -.49, SD = .24) than to call disgusted faces neutral (M = -.36, SD = 
.26).  There was a marginally significant main effect of group, F(2, 172) = 2.52, p = .08, 
ηp2 = .03, with comparison men showing a significantly weaker bias to call fearful and 
disgusted faces neutral (M = -.39, SD = .23) than did overweight men (M = -.46, SD = 
.17; t(145) = 2.30, p = .02), but not Black men (M = -.42, SD = .23; t(92) = .62, p = .54).  
In other words, overweight men were more conservative in their identification of a face 
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as fearful or disgusted than were comparison men. Black men and overweight men’s 
biases did not differ, t(107) = 1.07, p = .29. 
 As before, I also examined the evidence for this prediction by running 3 (group: 
Black men, overweight men, comparison men) X 6 (percent morph: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
60) Mixed ANOVAs on ratings given first to the fearful faces and then the disgusted 
faces (see Figures 5 and 6).  If Black men overperceive fear on faces, or are more 
confident that a fearful face is fearful, that then we should see that their ratings were 
lower than other groups in judging fearful faces.  Although the main effect of group was 
significant, F(2, 172) = 5.28, p = .001, ηp2 = .06, Black men in fact gave higher ratings to 
fearful faces (indicating less confident ratings of fear; M = 3.07, SD = .64) than did 
comparison men (M = 2.78, SD = .41; t(92) = 2.65, p = .01). Overweight men also gave 
higher ratings to fearful faces than did comparison men (M = 2.95, SD = .37; t(145) = 
2.75, p = .007), and overweight men’s and Black men’s ratings did not differ from each 
other, t(145) = 1.18, p = .24.  In addition, a significant interaction of percent morph with 
group indicates that this main effect of group differed between the various percent morph 
levels, F(10, 860) = 2.24, p = .014, ηp2 = .03.  Examining simple effects tests shows that 
the difference between comparison men and Black men is nonsignificant at 10% (p = 
.92), marginal at 20% (p = .06), and significant for those morphs at 30% or greater (ps < 
.04). The difference between comparison men and overweight men is nonsignificant at 
10%, 50%, or 60% (ps > .059), and significant for those morphs between 20% and 40% 
(ps < .04).  Thus, as in the no salience condition, Black men were significantly less 
confident that a face was fearful than were comparison men, but only for faces with less 
subtle fear expressions. Overweight men for whom prejudice was salient were less 
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confident than comparison men that somewhat subtly fearful expressed fear, but this 
difference disappeared for more faces with more extreme fear expressions. 
 If overweight men overperceive disgust on faces, or are more confident that a 
disgusted face is disgusted, then we should see that their ratings were higher overall in 
judging disgusted faces. There was no main effect of group, F(2, 172) = 1.18, p = .31, ηp2 
= .01; overweight men, M = 5.36, SD = .40; comparison men, M = 5.46, SD = .40, Black 
men, M = 5.38, SD = .40. There was also no interaction of percent morph with group, 
F(10, 860) = 1.62, p = .10, ηp2 = .02. Thus, the different groups did not rate disgust 
morphs differently, and there were no group differences across the percentages of disgust 
morphs. 
 In sum, there was no clear evidence to support Prediction 2.  Instead, it appears 
that, when prejudice is salient, overweight men are somewhat more conservative than 
Black men or comparison men in calling a face fearful or disgusted, Black men and 
overweight men are less confident in their judgments of fearful faces than are comparison 
group men, and there were no group differences in confidence judging disgusted faces. 
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Figure 5. Mean ratings of fearful faces, with standard error bars, for participants in the 
prejudice salience condition. 
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Figure 6. Mean ratings of disgusted faces, with standard error bars, for participants in the 
prejudice salience condition. 
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Follow-up to predictions 1 and 2: Prejudice salience effects by group  
 The analyses above showed that Black and overweight men were if anything 
underperceiving fear or disgust on others’ faces compared to comparison men. However, 
it is possible that for each group, the prejudice salience condition generated 
overperception of these emotions relative to their own baseline – that is, their tendencies 
to perceive fear and disgust when prejudice is not salient. To test this possibility, for both 
Black men and overweight men, I ran a series of ANOVAs with prejudice salience 
(salient, not salient) as a between-subjects condition, and looked at effects on confidence 
and bias for perceiving fear and disgust [there were no effects on sensitivity, all ps > .12]. 
See Figures 7 – 10 for means and standard errors of face ratings organized by group. 
 For Black men, prejudice salience did not affect their confidence in perceiving 
fear (across face morphs), F < 1, p = .50.  Furthermore, for no percentage morph was 
prejudice salience condition predictive of Black men’s confidence that a face was fearful, 
all Fs < 1, ps > .42.  Likewise, there was no effect of prejudice salience on Black men’s 
bias to call a face fearful, F < 1, p = .46. 
 Although Black men tended toward greater confidence in judging disgusted faces 
when prejudice was salient, this difference was not significant, F(1, 62) = 2.86, p = .10, 
ηp2 = .04. Examining each percentage morph separately, there was a significant effect of 
prejudice salience on Black men’s confidence in judging faces that were 60% disgusted, 
F(1, 62) = 4.47, p = .04, ηp2 = .07, but for no other percentage morph was this difference 
significant, all ps > .08.  When prejudice was salient, Black men showed a somewhat less 
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conservative bias to call faces disgusted, but this difference was not significant, F(1, 62) 
= 2.52, p = .12, ηp2 = .04. 
 Overweight men were non-significantly less confident in their face judgments 
when prejudice was salient than when it was not, F(1, 185) = 2.69, p = .10, ηp2 = .01.  
Their confidence in judging 40% fearful faces was significantly lower when prejudice 
was salient, F(1, 185) = 4.86, p = .03, ηp2 = .03; for all other percentage morphs, the 
effect of prejudice salience was marginal (for 10%; F(1, 185) = 3.39, p = .07, ηp2 = .02) 
or nonsignificant (all other ps > .14).  Overweight men showed no effect of prejudice 
salience on bias to call a face fearful, F(1, 185) = 1.27, p = .26, ηp2 = .01. 
 Overweight men showed no effect of prejudice salience on confidence that a face 
is disgusted, F < 1, p = .74, and for no percentage morph was there a significant effect of 
prejudice salience on confidence, all Fs < 1, ps > .56.  There was also no effect of 
prejudice salience on overweight men’s bias to call a face disgusted, F < 1, p = .80. 
 Thus, there is little statistical evidence that the prejudice salience manipulation 
affected Black or overweight men’s perception of fear or disgust on other’s faces.  It is 
worth noting that the mean differences for Black men are substantial and in the direction 
of greater over-perception when prejudice is salience.  It will be important to test this 
possibility with a larger sample. 

















Figure 7. Mean ratings of fearful faces, with standard error bars, for Black men. 















Figure 8. Mean ratings of fearful faces, with standard error bars, for overweight men. 
 
















Figure 9. Mean ratings of disgusted faces, with standard error bars, for Black men. 
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Prediction 3. Black men are expected to perceive fear more often on female than 
male faces (H1b) 
 To test whether Black men perceive fear more often on female than on male 
faces, as well as whether this was more pronounced in the prejudice salience condition, I 
conducted a 2 (target sex: male, female) X 2 (prejudice salience manipulation) Mixed 
ANOVA on the average judgments of all fearful faces. Contrary to predictions, Black 
men were less confident that female faces were fearful (M = 3.19, SD = .56) than they 
were that male faces were fearful (M = 2.98, SD = .75), F(1, 62) = 20.47, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.25. There was no significant effect of prejudice salience condition or interaction of 
emotion with prejudice salience condition, Fs < 1. 
 Next, I conducted the same analyses using the dependent variable c (bias).  Again, 
contrary to predictions, Black men were less likely to call a female face fearful (M = -.51, 
SD = .28) than they were to call a male face fearful (M = -.39, SD = .28), F(1, 62) = 
10.72, p = .002, ηp2 = .15. 
 For both dependent variables (confidence and bias), both overweight and 
comparison men also judged male faces to be more fearful than female faces, ps < .001. 
 Perhaps Black men are better able to discriminate whether fear is present in 
female faces than in male faces.  To test this, I conducted the same ANOVA as above, 
with target sex and prejudice salience as factors, on the dependent variable d’.  Higher 
scores indicate better performance distinguishing when fear is present from when it is 
absent. Black men showed no difference in d’ for identifying fear on male (M = 1.09, SD 
= .80) vs. female (M = 1.04, SD = .52) faces, F < 1.  In contrast, both comparison men 
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and overweight men showed greater discrimination for fear appearing on male faces 
(comparison men: M = 1.46, SD = .47; overweight men: M = 1.43, SD = .44) compared 
to female faces (comparison men: M = 1.37, SD = .37; overweight men: M = 1.29, SD = 
.35), comparison men, F(1, 136) = 4.89, p = .03, ηp2 = .04, overweight men, F(1, 185) = 
20.48, p < .001, ηp2 = .10.  Interestingly, Black men showed lower discrimination of fear 
in faces overall (M = 1.25, SD = .64) compared to either comparison men (M = 1.62, SD 
= .36; t(200) = 5.13, p < .001) or overweight men (M = 1.57, SD = .34; t(249) = 5.05, p 
< .001), interaction F(2, 383) = 17.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .09 [note that these d’ values are 
higher than those reported separately for female and male targets because to calculate hit 
and false alarm rates, one substitutes different values for 0 and 1 when basing the rates on 
three judgments vs. six judgments].  Thus, Black men showed equivalent sensitivity for 
identifying fear in male and female faces, and less sensitivity overall than the other 
groups, whereas comparison and overweight men both were better at discriminating fear 
in men’s faces than in women’s faces. 
Prediction set 4: Moderator variables 
 I predicted that a host of variables would moderate Black men’s and overweight 
men’s perception of fear/disgust expressions on others’ faces.  To examine each 
moderator, I conducted separate regressions for each participant group, first with only the 
moderator variable as a predictor, and second with the addition of prejudice salience 
(categorical: salient, not salient) and the interaction of prejudice salience and the 
moderator.  For each moderator, I ran this set of regressions on three sets of dependent 
variables: 1) overall confidence that the target emotion was present (i.e., ratings of the 
facial expression as 1=definitely fear to 7=definitely disgust) across percentage morphs, 
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2) c (bias), and 3) d’ (sensitivity). Here I will focus on those results that were interesting 
or significant; moderator variables that are not mentioned below did not produce any 
significant effects in predicting perception of disgust or fear on others’ faces. The 
prejudice salience manipulation rarely interacted with the moderators; statistics for 
instances in which this interaction was significant are included below. See Table 2 for 
correlations of the moderator variables with the outcome variables, Table 3 for Black and 
overweight men’s mean and standard deviation values on the moderator variables, and 
Table 4 for correlations among the moderator variables.
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Belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified. I predicted that believing 
prejudice toward one’s group is justified would negatively predict perception of 
prejudice-relevant emotional expressions.  That is, if others’ prejudice is justified, there 
may be less of a motivation to change that prejudice, and thus less of a motive to detect 
that prejudice. 
 Black men. For Black men, belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified 
predicted less overall confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .43, t = 3.73, p < .001 
[note that because greater confidence that a face expresses fear is reflected in lower 
scores, the β value is positive].  It also predicted lesser sensitivity (d’) in determining 
whether a face is fearful, β = -.36, t = -3.02, p = .004.  Belief that prejudice toward one’s 
group is justified did not predict Black men’s bias to call a face fearful, β = -.19, t = -
1.47, p = .15. 
 Belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified also predicted less overall 
confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = -.34, t = -2.86, p = .006 [note that because 
greater confidence that a face expresses disgust is reflected in higher scores, the β value 
is negative].  This effect was moderated by prejudice salience, β = -.43, t = -3.65, p = 
.001.  Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice was not salient, belief that prejudice 
is justified predicts confidence that a face is disgusted, β = -.58, t = -4.24, p < .001, 
whereas this was not the case when prejudice was salient, β = .30, t = 1.51, p = .14. 
 Belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified also predicted lesser 
sensitivity for Black men in determining whether a face is disgusted, β = -.43, t = -3.75, p 
< .001; Black men who believe prejudice is justified were less sensitive at discriminating 
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whether or not a face expresses disgust. Prejudice salience condition did moderate this 
effect, β = -.32, t = -2.74, p = .008. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is not 
salient, belief that prejudice is justified does not predict sensitivity at discriminating 
whether or not a face expresses disgust, β = .03, t = .16, p = .87, whereas it does when 
prejudice is salient, β = -.64, t = -4.60, p < .001. 
 Belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified did not predict Black men’s 
bias to call a face disgusted, β = .09, t = .66, p = .51.  It did, however, interact with 
prejudice salience condition to predict bias to call a face disgusted, β = -.28, t = -2.12, p = 
.04. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is not salient, belief that prejudice is 
justified does not predict bias to call a face disgusted, β = -.03, t = -.22, p = .83, whereas 
it does when prejudice is salient, β = .54, t = 2.43, p = .02. 
 Overweight men. For overweight men, belief that prejudice toward one’s group is 
justified marginally predicted less confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .14, t = 
1.91, p = .06. It did not predict either sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, 
β = -.08, t = -1.09, p = .28, or bias to call a face fearful, β = -.09, t = -1.17, p = .24. 
 Similarly, when predicting overweight men’s perception of disgust, belief that 
prejudice toward one’s group is justified predicted lower overall confidence that a face 
expresses disgust, β = -.17, t = -2.33, p = .02, but did not predict overweight men’s 
sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, β = -.02, t = -.32, p = .75, or bias to 
call a face disgusted, β = -.07, t = -.97, p = .34. 
 Thus, for Black men, belief that prejudice toward one’s group is justified 
predicted both lesser confidence and lesser sensitivity in perceiving fear and disgust on 
others’ faces, and it did not predict any bias to call a face fearful or disgusted. For 
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overweight men, greater belief that prejudice toward their group is justified weakly 
predicted lesser confidence in identifying disgust on others’ faces, but did not otherwise 
produce any effects. 
 Belief that group status differences are legitimate. I predicted that greater 
beliefs that group status differences are legitimate would negatively predict perception of 
prejudice-relevant emotional expressions. 
 Black men. For Black men, belief that status differences are legitimate predicted 
less overall confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .51, t = 4.62, p < .001, as well as 
lesser sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = -.44, t = -3.83, p < .001. 
Belief that status differences are legitimate did not predict any bias for Black men to call 
faces fearful, β = -.21, t = -1.68, p = .10. 
 For Black men, belief that status differences are legitimate also predicted less 
overall confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = -.44, t = -3.86, p < .001, and lesser 
sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, β = -.35, t = -2.97, p = .004. Belief 
that status differences are legitimate did not predict Black men’s bias to call a face 
disgusted, β = .02, t = .18, p = .86. 
 Overweight men. For overweight men, belief that status differences are legitimate 
predicted lesser confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .24, t = 3.40, p < .001, as 
well as lesser sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = -.15, t = -2.12, p = 
.04. Belief that status differences are legitimate did not predict overweight men’s bias to 
call a face fearful, β = -.10, t = -1.31, p = .19.  
 For overweight men, belief that status differences are legitimate also predicted 
less overall confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = -.26, t = -3.67, p < .001, as well 
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as lesser sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, β = -.18, t = -2.42, p = .02. 
Belief that status differences are legitimate did not predict overweight men’s bias to call a 
face disgusted, β = -.05, t = -.66, p = .51. 
 Thus, for both Black men and overweight men, greater belief that status 
differences are legitimate predicted lesser confidence and sensitivity in identifying fear 
and disgust on others’ faces. Neither Black men’s nor overweight men’s belief that status 
differences are legitimate predicted a bias to see fear or disgust. 
 Could it be that these results are due to a general relationship between the belief 
that status differences are legitimate and the perception of fear and disgust on others’ 
faces?  In other words, does one need to be a member of a stigmatized group to show this 
relationship, or might anyone who believes status differences are legitimate perceive less 
fear and disgust on others’ faces?  To test this idea, I examined whether belief that status 
differences are legitimate correlated with confidence, sensitivity, and bias to see fear and 
disgust for the comparison group men.5  Only one correlation was significant, and was 
small in magnitude: greater belief that status differences are legitimate predicted less 
confidence in perceiving disgust on others’ faces, r = -.18, p = .04; all other rs <.16, ps > 
.05.  To formally test whether the relationship of this belief to the dependent variables 
was significantly greater among Black and overweight men than among comparison men, 
I conducted ANOVAs with group as a between-subjects variable, and belief that status 
differences are legitimate as a covariate, and specified for the model to include the 
interaction between these two variables.  I conducted this analysis on the four variables                                                                
5 I also ran these same analyses for all other moderators discussed in this section.  Only 
two other correlations out of 24 were significant, and both were small in magnitude (rs = 
.19), so are not discussed further. 
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that produced a significant relationship for Black and overweight men: confidence and 
sensitivity in perceiving fear, and confidence and sensitivity in perceiving disgust.  The 
interaction of group with beliefs that status differences are legitimate was significant for 
both confidence (F(2, 383) = 7.37, p = .001, ηp2 = .04) and sensitivity (F(2, 383) = 5.45, p 
= .005, ηp2 = .03) in perceiving fear, indicating that for Black and obese men, belief that 
status differences are legitimate was significantly more predictive than for comparison 
group men.  However, this interaction was not significant for either confidence (F(2, 383) 
= 1.53, p = .22, ηp2 = .01) or sensitivity (F(2, 383) = 1.82, p = .16, ηp2 = .01) in perceiving 
disgust, suggesting that there were no group differences in the extent to which beliefs that 
status differences are legitimate predicted these outcomes (for all outcomes, the main 
effect of these beliefs remained significant, ps > .02).  This suggests that believing status 
differences are legitimate may indeed lead only stigmatized groups to be less confident 
in, and less discriminating in perceiving, fear in others’ faces, but that these beliefs lead 
to less confidence and discrimination in perceiving disgust in others’ faces, regardless 
one’s group membership. 
 Might the apparent effects of believing that status differences are legitimate be in 
fact driven by participants’ political conservatism?  One could make this prediction 
because conservatism can include a preference for maintaining of the status quo, as well 
as a belief in meritocracy,, and thus conservatives might tend to believe that existing 
status differences are acceptable and/or justified.  However, the data do not support this 
hypothesis.  Belief that status differences are legitimate only modestly correlated with 
political conservatism across the sample, r(385) = .40, p < .001, political conservatism 
did not predict any dependent variable for any group (all ps > .10), and controlling for 
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political conservatism did not eliminate any effects of belief that status differences are 
legitimate.  Of course this does not eliminate the possibility that some other variable may 
account for the effect of this belief on confidence and bias in perceiving fear and disgust, 
but it does appear that political conservatism is unlikely to account for these effects. 
 Participants’ belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations.  I predicted 
that to the extent participants believe they can manage stigmatizing situations, they would 
be more likely to see fear or disgust on others’ faces. 
 Black men. For Black men, belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations 
predicted greater overall confidence that a face expresses fear, β = -.33, t = -2.74, p = 
.008, and greater sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = .26, t = 2.11, p = 
.04.  It also predicted greater bias to call a face fearful (or rather, given the overall 
conservative tendency in the sample for participants to call a face fearful, a less 
conservative bias to call a face fearful), β = .29, t = 2.40, p = .02. 
 Black men’s belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations also predicted 
greater overall confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = .29, t = 2.35, p = .02.  It did 
not, however, predict Black men’s sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, 
β = .16, t = 1.24, p = .22, or bias to call a face disgusted, β = .12, t = .94, p = .35.  
 Overweight men. For overweight men, belief that they can manage stigmatizing 
situations did not predict any outcomes for fear or disgust: overall confidence that a face 
is expressing fear, β = -.03, t = -.36, p = .72, sensitivity in determining whether a face is 
fearful, β = -.01, t = -.06, p = .95, or bias to call a face fearful, β = -.03, t = -.39, p = .70, 
confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = .05, t = .62, p = .53, sensitivity in 
determining whether a face is disgusted, β = .04, t = .50, p = .62, bias to call a face 
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disgusted, β = -.01, t = -.14.  This was not because overweight men were less certain than 
Black men that they could manage stigmatizing situations – in fact, they were more likely 
to say they could manage stigmatizing situations than were Black men (for group means 
and t-test, see Table 3). 
 Thus, Black men’s belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations predict 
greater confidence, sensitivity, and bias in perceiving fear, as well as confidence that a 
face expresses disgust.  In contrast, it did not predict perception of either fear or disgust 
for overweight men. 




Figure 11. Estimates of Black men’s ratings that a face is fearful at high and low belief 
that they can manage stigmatizing situations. p-values indicate the significance of the 
correlation of participant’s belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations with 
confidence that a face is fearful at each percentage of target fear. 
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Figure 12. Estimates of Black men’s ratings that a face is disgusted at high and low belief 
that they can manage stigmatizing situations. P-values indicate the significance of the 
correlation of participant’s belief that they can manage stigmatizing situations with 
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 Stigma consciousness. I predicted that greater stigma consciousness would 
positively predict perception of prejudice-relevant emotional expressions. 
 Black men. For Black men, stigma consciousness predicted greater overall 
confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = -.29, t = -2.37, p = .02, as well as greater 
sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = .28, t = 2.31, p = .03.  Stigma 
consciousness did not predict Black men’s bias to call faces fearful, β = .15, t = 1.18, p = 
.24. 
 For Black men, stigma consciousness did not predict greater overall confidence 
that a face expresses disgust, β = .14, t = 1.12, p = .26.  However, there was a marginally 
significant interaction of stigma consciousness with prejudice salience condition, β = .24, 
t = 1.94, p = .06. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is salient, stigma 
consciousness does not predict Black men’s confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = 
-.21, t = -1.04, p = .30, whereas when prejudice is not salient, stigma consciousness 
marginally significantly predicts lesser confidence that a face is disgusted, β = .29, t = 
1.81, p = .08. 
 Stigma consciousness did not predict Black men’s sensitivity in determining 
whether a face is disgusted, β = .12, t = .93, p = .36.  It also did not predict Black men’s 
bias to call a face disgusted overall, β = .10, t = .78, p = .44, but it did interact with 
prejudice salience condition to predict bias to call a face disgusted, β = .26, t = 2.05, p = 
.05. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is salient, stigma consciousness 
predicts a nonsignificant tendency toward a conservative bias to call faces disgusted, β = 
-.26, t = -1.21, p = .20, and when prejudice is not salient, stigma consciousness 
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nonsignificantly predicts a less conservative bias to call faces disgusted, β = .27, t = 1.65, 
p = .10. 
 Overweight men. For overweight men, stigma consciousness predicted greater 
confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = -.20, t = -2.70, p = .008, as well as greater 
sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = .14, t = 1.95, p = .05. Stigma 
consciousness also predicted a less conservative bias to call a face fearful, β = .16, t = 
2.28, p = .02. 
 For overweight men, stigma consciousness marginally predicted greater 
confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = .13, t = 1.76, p = .08. Stigma consciousness 
did not predict overweight men’s sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, β 
= .12, t = 1.66, p = .10, or bias to call a face disgusted, β = -.02, t = -.26, p = .79. 
 Thus, for both Black and overweight men, greater stigma consciousness positively 
predicted confidence that a face expresses fear, and sensitivity in determining whether a 
face is fearful.  For overweight men, stigma consciousness also predicted a less 
conservative bias to call a face fearful.  For neither group did stigma consciousness 
clearly predict confidence, sensitivity, or bias in perceiving disgust. 
 Metastereotypes that people fear one’s group.6 I predicted that holding stronger 
metastereotypes that people fear one’s group would predict greater perception of fear on 
others’ faces. 
                                                               
6 I had no predictions that fear metastereotypes would predict perception of disgust 
expressions, but I ran the analyses anyway.  The results are below: 
 Fear metastereotypes predicting disgust. Fear metastereotypes did not predict 
Black men’s confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = .17, t = 1.38, p = .17.  There 
was no main effect of fear metastereotypes predicting Black men’s sensitivity in 
determining whether a face is disgusted, β = .11, t = .88, p = .38.  However, prejudice 
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 Black men. For Black men, fear metastereotypes did not predict overall 
confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = -.12, t = -.93, p = .36, or sensitivity in 
determining whether a face is fearful, β = .06, t = .49, p = .62.  It did, however, predict a 
greater bias to call a face fearful, β = .33, t = 2.77, p = .007 (See Figure 13 for Black 
men’s estimated bias to call a face fearful at each level of the percentage morphs of 
fearful faces, at high and low levels of fear metastereotypes).  
 Overweight men. For overweight men, fear metastereotypes did not predict 
overall confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .13, t = 1.72, p = .09, though there 
was a significant interaction with prejudice salience, β = .16, t = 2.23, p = .03. Simple 
slopes tests show that when prejudice is salient, fear metastereotypes do not predict                                                                                                                                                                                            
salience condition did interact with fear metastereotypes, β = -.29, t = -2.33, p = .02. 
Simple effects tests show that when prejudice is not salient, fear metastereotypes do not 
predict sensitivity at discriminating whether or not a face expresses disgust, β = -.16, t = -
.91, p = .37, whereas it does when prejudice is salient, β = .42, t = 2.38, p = .02.  Black 
men’s fear metastereotypes also predicted Black men’s bias to call a face disgusted, β = 
.36, t = 3.06, p = .003. 
 For overweight men, fear metastereotypes predicted confidence that a face 
expresses disgust, β = -.21, t = -2.85, p = .005, and it did interact with prejudice salience 
condition, β = -.19, t = 2.64, p = .009. Simple effects tests show that when prejudice is 
not salient, fear metastereotypes predict sensitivity at discriminating whether or not a face 
expresses disgust, β = -.38, t = -3.90, p < .001, whereas it does not when prejudice is 
salient, β = -.01, t = -.07, p = .95. 
Fear metastereotypes also predicted overweight men’s sensitivity in determining whether 
a face is disgusted, β = -.15, t = -2.04, p = .04. Fear metastereotypes did not predict 
overweight men’s bias to call a face disgusted, β = .03, t = .45, p = .66. 
 Overall, then, the relationship of fear metastereotypes to disgust perception is 
unclear: Black men’s fear metastereotypes predicted a generally less conservative bias to 
call a face disgusted, and when prejudice was salient, fear metastereotypes also predicted 
Black men’s lesser sensitivity at determining whether a face expresses disgust.  For 
overweight men, fear metastereotypes predicted generally lower sensitivity at 
determining whether a face expresses disgust, and, when prejudice was salient, lesser 
confidence that a face expresses disgust. 
  
  65 
overweight men’s confidence that a face expresses fear, β = -.05, t = -.46, p = .65, 
whereas when prejudice is not salient, fear metastereotypes predict lesser confidence that 
a face is fearful, β = .27, t = 2.75, p = .007. Overweight men’s fear metastereotypes also 
predicted lesser sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = -.15, t = -2.00, p 
= .05. Fear metastereotypes did not, however, predict overweight men’s bias to call a face 
fearful, β = .05, t = .68, p = .50. 
 Thus, there was some evidence that for Black men, greater metastereotypes of 
fear predict a tendency to see fear on others’ faces.  For overweight men for whom 
prejudice was not salient, fear metastereotypes predicted less confidence in detecting fear 
on faces, and for all overweight participants, fear metastereoypes predicted less 
sensitivity in calling a face fearful. 
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Figure 13. Black men’s estimated bias to call a face fearful at each level of the percentage 
morphs of fearful faces, at high and low levels of fear metastereotypes.  p-values indicate 
the significance of the correlation of fear metastereotypes with response bias at each 
percentage of target fear. 
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 Metastereotypes that people are physically disgusted by one’s group.7 I 
predicted that holding stronger metastereotypes that people are physically disgusted by 
one’s group would predict greater perception of disgust on others’ faces. 
 Black men. For Black men, physical disgust metastereotypes did not predict 
greater overall confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = -.08, t = -.59, p = .56, but did 
interact with prejudice salience condition to predict confidence that a face expresses 
disgust, β = -.66, t = -3.01, p = .004. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is not 
salient, stronger physical disgust metastereotypes predict lesser confidence in detecting 
disgust, β = -33, t = -2.22, p = .03, but when prejudice is salient, stronger physical disgust 
metastereotypes predict greater confidence, β = .39, t = 2.07, p = .04. 
 In parallel, although physical disgust metastereotypes did not predict Black men’s 
sensitivity in determining whether a face is disgusted, β = -.16, t = -1.25, p = .22, 
prejudice salience condition did interact with physical disgust metastereotypes to predict 
sensitivity, β = -.78, t = -3.63, p = .001. Simple slopes tests show that when prejudice is 
not salient, Black men’s physical disgust metastereotypes predict lesser sensitivity at 
discriminating whether or not a face expresses disgust, β = -.49, t = -3.25, p = .002, 
                                                               
7 Disgust metastereotypes predicting fear. For Black men, physical disgust 
metastereotypes did not predict overall confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = .20, t 
= 1.59, p = .12, sensitivity in determining whether a face is fearful, β = -.08, t = -.59, p = 
.56, or bias to call a face fearful, β = .13, t = 1.06, p = .30.  
 For overweight men, physical disgust metastereotypes did not predict overall 
confidence that a face is expressing fear, β = -.09, t = -1.22, p = .23, sensitivity in 
determining whether a face is fearful, β = .02, t = .27, p = .79, or bias to call a face 
fearful, β = .10, t = 1.35, p = .18.   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whereas when prejudice is salient, physical disgust metastereotypes predict greater 
sensitivity, β = .37, t = 2.03, p = .05. 
 Physical disgust metastereotypes also predicted Black men’s bias to call a face 
disgusted, β = .32, t = 2.64, p = .01 (See Figure 14 for Black men’s overall estimated bias 
to call a face disgusted at each level of the percentage morphs of disgusted faces, at high 
and low levels of disgust metastereotypes). 
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Figure 14. Black men’s estimated bias to call a face disgusted at each level of the 
percentage morphs of disgusted faces, at high and low levels of disgust metastereotypes. 
P-values indicate the significance of the correlation of disgust metastereotypes with 
response bias at each percentage of target disgust. 
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 Overweight men. For overweight men, physical disgust metastereotypes did not 
predict confidence that a face expresses disgust, β = -.04, t = -.50, p = .62 or sensitivity in 
determining whether a face is disgusted, β = .02, t = .27, p = .79. 
 Physical disgust metastereotypes did not predict overweight men’s bias to call a 
face disgusted, β = -.03, t = -.38, p = .71, but did interact with prejudice salience 
condition in predicting bias to call a face disgusted, β = -.61, t = -2.61, p = .01. Simple 
slopes tests show that when prejudice is not salient, physical disgust metastereotypes 
predict, to a marginally significant extent, lesser bias at discriminating whether or not a 
face expresses disgust, β = -.17, t = -1.86, p = .07, whereas when prejudice is salient, 
physical disgust metastereotypes predict greater bias to a marginally significant extent, β 
= .23, t = 1.88, p = .06. 
 Thus, for Black men, metastereotypes of physical disgust predicted lesser 
confidence and sensitivity when prejudice was not salient, but greater confidence and 
sensitivity when prejudice was salient, in judging disgust on others’ faces.  For 
overweight men, when prejudice was salient, metastereotypes of physical disgust 
marginally predicted greater bias to call a face disgusted, and when prejudice was not 
salient, marginally predicted a lesser bias to call a face disgusted. 
 Summary. There was little support for Predictions 1 through 3.  When prejudice 
was not salient, Black men did not overperceive fear (in fact, they underperceived it), and 
overweight men did not overperceive disgust. Nor were these predicted tendencies 
evident when prejudice is salient. And lastly, Black men did not show differential 
perception of women’s fear expressions compared to men’s fear expressions. 
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 There was some evidence for Prediction 4.  It appears that believing prejudice 
against one’s group is justified, believing that status differences are legitimate, believing 
that you cannot manage stigmatizing interactions, and having low stigma consciousness 
all predict, to some extent, less confident and sensitive perception of fear and/or disgust. 
Discussion 
Summary of findings 
 Central propositions. This project makes several propositions.  The most broad-
level proposition is that members of stigmatized groups show specialized perception 
(over- or under-perception) of others’ negative emotional expressions.  The next, more 
fine-grained proposition is that members of different stigmatized groups show differential 
patterns of emotion perception.  And the most fine-grained proposition is that members 
of stigmatized groups become specialized perceivers of those specific emotions that color 
the prejudices they most commonly face. 
 There is mixed evidence for the first proposition (members of stigmatized groups 
show specialized perception of others’ negative emotional expressions): overall, Black 
men tended to perceive fear and disgust with lower confidence and sensitivity than 
comparison group men.  Overweight men’s perceptions, in contrast, generally did not 
differ from those of the comparison group men. However, the evidence from the 
moderator variables suggests that there may indeed be a relationship between being a 
member of a stigmatized group and perceiving other’s emotional expressions.  For 
example, for Black men and overweight men, belief that status differences are legitimate 
predicted underperception of fear on others’ faces, whereas it did not for comparison 
group men. 
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 There is also some evidence for the second proposition, that Black men and 
overweight people show different patterns of emotion perception.  When prejudice is not 
salient, Black men are less confident in their perception of both fear and disgust on 
others’ faces, whereas this is not so for overweight men.  Likewise, Table 3 shows that 
somewhat different moderator variables are at play in guiding the two groups’ perception 
of others’ emotional expressions. 
 There is less clear evidence for the third proposition: that Black men will over- (or 
under-) perceive fear, whereas overweight men will over- (or under-) perceive disgust.  
The evidence does not line up neatly with this prediction.  Instead, it appears that both 
Black men and overweight men may at some times show differential perception of both 
fear and disgust. There was thus little evidence to support the possibility of distinct 
psychologies of perceiving fear vs. disgust, at least for these groups. 
 Belief that group status differences are legitimate. One of the strongest 
statistical findings among these data was that to the extent Black men and overweight 
men believe group status differences are legitimate, the less likely they were to detect 
others’ fear and disgust (as measured by both confidence and sensitivity).  As discussed 
in the results section, this does not appear to be due to participants’ conservatism.  
Furthermore, if the relationship holds for stigmatized (Black and overweight) but not 
non-stigmatized (comparison) groups, that would rule out some alternative explanations 
about general tendencies to perceive fear and disgust on others’ faces that track this belief 
(such as engagement with the task).  There was some evidence for this (for fear 
perception, and nonsignificantly for disgust perception), though a larger sample will help 
to determine whether this pattern replicates and the relationship is indeed stronger among 
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stigmatized than non-stigmatized groups.  Nonetheless, this possibility echoes earlier 
research (Major et al., 2002), which found that another so-called “legitimizing” belief 
(belief in individual status mobility) predicted lesser perception of personal 
discrimination for low-status group members.  Thus, stigmatized group members’ belief 
that differences are legitimate may lead not only to lesser attributions to discrimination, 
but to weaker attention to and detection of prejudicial emotions.  
Implications for the psychology of perceiving prejudice 
 Black men. If these patterns are in fact robust, they suggest that Black men tend 
to less confidently and sensitively perceive fear and disgust on other’s faces, unless 
prejudice is salient. Thus Black men may be less discriminating about whether others are 
expressing these emotions toward them unless the situation they are in makes salient their 
own beliefs about prejudice. 
 Although few predictions regarding response bias were borne out – and indeed, 
across the groups, few differences in response bias emerged – one intriguing finding is 
that the extent to which Black men believe others fear their group, they show a bias to be 
more willing to call a face fearful (and likewise for disgust metastereotypes and bias to 
call a face disgusted).  This suggests that Black men’s beliefs about others’ prejudices 
toward them may indeed color the emotions they see on others’ faces. 
 Overweight men. Very few effects were observed for overweight men in terms 
of sensitivity, confidence, or bias in perceiving emotions.  Thus was true across prejudice 
salience conditions, as well as when comparing to the comparison group men.  Thus, it is 
unclear what conclusion to draw from the overweight men’s data.  Perhaps they are not 
chronically concerned about stigma, or perhaps stigma does not color their experiences to 
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the extent that it colors Black men’s experiences.  Perhaps because Black men may be 
socialized to expect, detect, and manage prejudice, they may develop a distinct 
psychology of fear and disgust perception, whereas because overweight people often 
become overweight later in life and also are not socialized to expect or manage prejudice 
in the same way, they do not develop a distinct psychology of fear and disgust 
perception. 
 The functional nature of prejudice perception. I proposed that the detection of 
prejudicial emotional expressions should be guided by the extent to which that emotion is 
perceived as useful information. I did find some support for the functional nature of 
emotion perception among the moderator effects.  Some variables that would make 
perceiving other’s fear and disgust less useful (belief that prejudice toward one’s group is 
justified, belief that group status differences are legitimate) predicted less sensitive and 
confident detection of emotional expressions.  In contrast, other variables that would 
render others’ fear and disgust useful or expected information (belief that one can 
manage stigmatizing interactions, stigma consciousness) to some extent predicted more 
sensitive and confident detection of emotional expressions.  Future work should seek to 
replicate and explore these effects. 
Sample and stimuli  
 Inclusion of overweight Black men. As noted in the Method section, including 
overweight Black men with the other Black men is a risk for a couple reasons: a) being 
overweight may lead Black men to have a baseline psychology of perceiving emotions 
that is similar to other overweight men (e.g., overperceiving disgust), and b) being an 
overweight Black man may lead one to be subjected to qualitatively different prejudices 
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and stereotypes than non-overweight Black men (e.g., perhaps people are afraid of non-
overweight Black men, but not obese Black men).  Given the small number of overweight 
Black men in the sample, I did not have the statistical power to formally test for group 
differences between overweight and non-overweight Black men.  Instead, to examine 
whether these possibilities might be distorting the Black male group’s results, I compared 
the patterns of results for the sample both including and excluding overweight Black 
men.  The patterns were the same, and thus I included all overweight Black men in the 
sample.  In the future, however, it would be useful to recruit sufficient numbers of Black 
men to be able to test whether identification as overweight produces different patterns of 
emotion perception. 
 Some disgusted faces = angry?  Several participants noted in their comments 
that some of the faces appeared to be angry.  The structure of the current task forced 
participants to identify the face as expressing disgust, fear, or no emotion, but if some 
faces appeared angry then the results may be colored somewhat by participants’ detection 
of and responses to anger expressions. Both stigmatized participant groups (Black men 
and overweight men) reported that people are equivalently angry toward their groups (Ms 
= 3.95 and 3.94, respectively), so any perception that the faces are angry is unlikely to 
account for group differences in responding to disgust. Still, one possibility for future 
work would be to pre-rate the faces on the extent to which they express anger, and choose 
only those faces not seen to express anger.  If, however, the facial morphology of anger 
and disgust expressions overlap, then this may not help, and other manifestations of 
emotional expression may be useful (see below). 
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Future directions 
 Other manifestations of fear and disgust. There are multiple channels through 
which emotions – and likewise, prejudice – are expressed.  Members of stigmatized 
groups may thus use other sources in addition to facial expressions to determine how 
someone might be feeling and might behave toward them.  For example, body language 
and speech might be used to gauge whether someone is afraid of or disgusted by you.  
Indeed, at modest distances body language may be a more unambiguous cue of others’ 
perception of the affordances you pose than are facial expressions, as well as one that is 
less controlled, and thus stigmatized targets might more sensitively perceive fearful or 
disgusted body language in others.   
 Interaction context.  This study only required participants to briefly look at faces 
of people they had never seen before.  Participants also likely completed the study from 
the comfort of their own home or workplace. This context may be quite different from 
contexts in which people expect to be targets of prejudice. For example, Brent Staples’ 
anecdote that others fear him took place during the night (Staples, 1995), and indeed, 
people’s stereotypes toward threatening outgroups are more salient when they are in the 
dark and thus are more (heuristically) vulnerable to danger (Schaller, et al., 2003). It may 
be that Black men are not particularly attuned to others’ fear unless they are in a situation 
that might be relevant to fear-based prejudice.  In the current study, Black men trended 
toward greater confidence that a face is fearful when prejudice was salient, compared to 
when it was not.  Future work could perhaps more powerfully manipulate prejudice-
relevance by changing the violence-threat-relevance of the situation in which Black men 
are detecting others’ fear.  Likewise, it may be that in disease- or reciprocity-threat-
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relevant situations, overweight people are more sensitive to whether others are feeling 
disgust toward them.  
 Stigma visibility. Both race and weight are visible attributes.  Thus, people who 
are stigmatized based on race and weight may come to expect others’ negative emotional 
expressions as responses to these visible, stigmatized characteristics.  Would those with 
concealable stigmas become similarly attuned to others’ negative expressions?  One 
might predict that those with completely concealable stigmas (e.g., religious orientation) 
may in fact be unlikely to differently perceive others’ negative expressions, because they 
likely have less experience with others expressing these emotions directly at them.  In 
contrast, perhaps someone with a potentially concealable, but not entirely concealable, 
stigma (e.g., an effeminate gay man), would be vigilant for signs of potential prejudice, 
and thus be more likely to detect subtle signs of negative emotions in others, and/or be 
biased to over-perceive those emotions. 
Implications for an affordance-based approach to managing prejudice 
 This project began from an affordance-based analysis of how targets of prejudice 
might try to detect others’ prejudice toward them.  Some results supported the utility of 
this analysis, and more broadly, of adopting a functional approach (e.g., the moderators 
that predict functionality of detecting others’ disgust and fear).  Other results did not 
neatly line up with my affordance-based predictions (e.g., Black men often showed 
parallel effects for disgust and fear, instead of for fear only; overweight men showed few 
differences from the comparison group in perceiving disgust).  However, instead of 
rejecting the affordance-based approach to managing stigma, we may need to more 
seriously consider the complexity of the affordances these groups are seen to pose, as 
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well as when these affordances are relevant to the target’s psychology. I have 
characterized Black men as targeted with fear-based prejudice, whereas overweight men 
are targeted with disgust-based prejudice.  In truth these groups are more accurately 
characterized as being targeted primarily with fear and disgust, respectively; the threats 
these groups are seen to pose, and the emotions direction toward them, do not consist of 
one emotion only, but are in fact complex arrays of multiple threats and emotions.  This 
complexity was registered in the texture of these groups’ metastereotypes, and thus these 
groups may become specialized perceivers of multiple, affordance-relevant emotions. 
 An affordance-based perspective also highlights two other important elements of 
detecting others’ prejudice: The affordance-relevance of the current situation (as 
discussed above regarding the darkness of the room; the health-relevance of the setting), 
and the particular relationship of the stigmatized to the potential stigmatizer (e.g., Is the 
potential stigmatizer likely to feel threatened by the stigmatized person?  What is the cost 
to the stigmatized person of missing this particular person’s emotional expression?).  
Incorporating these elements into future research may help us to discover how people 
who are chronically seen to pose violence, disease, or other threats may sensitively attune 
their perception of others’ prejudices in order to functionally manage their social 
interactions. 
 More broadly, this affordance-based approach to understanding the target side of 
stigma may help us to discover and explain a variety of phenomena beyond emotion 
perception.  Once prejudice is detected, what specific strategies do targets use to manage 
that prejudice?  Which emotion-specific prejudices affects self-esteem?  What norms and 
  79 
skills emerge within stigmatized groups for managing prejudice?  An affordance-based 
approach may have much to offer these and other questions. 
Conclusion 
 Research is only beginning to uncover how threat- and emotion-specific prejudice 
affects targets.  This project adopts a functional approach to understanding how members 
of stigmatized groups may come to be differently attuned to others’ emotions, and 
provides a starting point for understanding the functional nature of perceiving prejudice-
relevant emotional expressions. 
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STEREOTYPE/PREJUDICE SALIENCE MANIPULATION 
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Items below refer to “obese people” and were administered to overweight men.  Items 
referring, instead, to “African Americans” were administered to Black men.  For both 
groups, these items were first administered in reference to “Native Americans”. 
Instructions: 
What do people generally think of obese people? Take a second to think about most 
people’s impressions of obese people. 
When most people think about obese people, in general, they feel… 
 
(1=not at all, 9=extremely) 
 
1. comfortable with them? 
2. morally disgusted by them? 
3. pity for them? 
4. frightened of them? 
5. physically disgusted by them? 
6. negative towards them? 
7. angry at them? 
8. grossed out by them? 
9. positive towards them? 
10. admiration for them? 
11. afraid of them? 
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What do people generally think of obese people? Take a second to think about most 
people’s impressions of obese people. 
 
In general, most people feel that obese people… 
 
1. provide benefits to others. 
2.  pose problems for others. 
3.  choose to take more from than they give back. 
4.  provide enjoyable entertainment (e.g., art, music, food). 
5.  endanger the physical safety of others. 
6.  take and/or damage others’ personal property or resources. 
7.  promote values that directly oppose others’ values. 
8.  increase others’ risk of physical illness. 
9.  protect others’ physical safety. 
10. cannot be trusted. 
11.  need to take more than they are able to give back. 
12.  are physically dangerous. 
13.  steal and/or harm others’ personal possessions. 
14.  offer interesting and/or novel amusements (e.g., art, music, food). 
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The following items are from established measures of legitimizing ideologies (O’Brien & 
Major, 2005) 
Items from the Belief in a Just 
World Scale (r=.43) 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
I feel that people get what they deserve. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I feel that people treat each other with the respect 
that they deserve. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Items from the Protestant Work 
Ethic Scale  (r=.64) 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1. If people work hard they almost always get 
what the want. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Most people who don't get ahead should not 
blame the system; they really have only 
themselves to blame. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Legitimizing items (r=.59) Strongly Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1. America is a just society where differences in 
status between groups reflect actual group 
differences. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Differences in status between groups in 
American society are fair. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX C  
PROPOSED MODERATORS MEASURED IN REFERENCE TO BOTH NATIVE 
AMERICANS AND ONE’S GROUP [BLACK PEOPLE/OBESE PEOPLE] 
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Participants’ belief that a person’s prejudice can change 
(items adapted from Neel & Shapiro (2012) to be specific to prejudice toward obese 
people and Black people).  
(Black participants: α = .87; Overweight 
participants: α = .83) 
Strongly 
Disagree   
Strongly 
Agree 
1. If a person is prejudiced toward [Black 
people/obese people], there isn't much that can be 
done to change their feelings. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2. A person’s level of bias toward [Black 
people/obese people] is something basic about 
them and they can’t change it much.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. People can always substantially change how 
biased they are toward [Black people/obese 
people]. (R)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Participants’ belief that prejudice toward their group is just/unjust 
[Generated for this study] 
Group-specific beliefs that 
prejudice/discrimination is just (Black 
participants: r = .52; Overweight participants: r 
= .46) 
[Given these low correlations, analyses were 
conducted on the separate items as well.  This 
did not change the results. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1. People should not treat [Black people/obese 
people] differently from others. (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It’s OK that people sometimes feel 
negatively toward [Black people/obese people]. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Perceived social acceptability of prejudice toward the participant’s group. [Generated for 
this study] 
(Black participants: r = .53; 
Overweight participants: r = 
.62) 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
  93 
   
1. Most people think it is OK to hold 
prejudices toward [Black people/ obese 
people]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It is socially acceptable to be prejudiced 
toward [Black people/obese people]. (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Items selected and modified from the Stigma Consciousness Scale (Pinel, 1999) 
 
(Black participants: α = .81; 
Overweight participants: α = .68) 
Strongly 
Agree    
Strongly 
Disagree 
1.  Most people do not judge [Black 
people/ obese people] on the basis of 
their [race/weight].   
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2.  Most people have a lot more 
[racist/anti-fat] thoughts than they 
actually express. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
3. Most people have a problem viewing 
[Black people / overweight people] as 
equals. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
The perceived severity of discrimination faced by their group / perceptions of how 
damaging discrimination would be. 
 [Generated for this study] 
In general, if a [Black 
person/obese person] is the target 
of prejudice/discrimination… 
Not at all 
severe    
Extremely 
severe 
1. how severe are the overall consequences for 
the [Black person/obese person]? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Participants’ motivation to detect and manage others’ prejudice toward them. [Generated 
for this study] 
Motivation to detect others’ prejudice (Black 
participants: r=.86; overweight participants: 
r=.89) 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1. If someone were prejudiced toward me, I 
would want to know that. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I want to know who is and is not prejudiced 
toward me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Motivation to manage others’ prejudice (Black 
participants: r=49; overweight participants: 
r=.50) 
       
3. It is important to me that others are not 
prejudiced toward me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. If I think I might be the target of prejudice, I 
try to change that person’s feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participants’ belief that they can manage stigma-tinged interactions/situations. 
[Generated for this study] 
(Black participants: α=.75; overweight 
participants: α=.79) 
Strongly 
Disagree    
Strongly 
Agree 
1. When someone is prejudiced toward me, 
there are things that I can do to make the 
situation better for myself. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. If I think I might be the target of prejudice, 
there are things I can do to change that 
situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. When someone is prejudiced toward me, the 
situation is out of my control. (R) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Participants’ perceptions of how damaging personal discrimination would be. 




disagree    
Strongly 
agree 
1. If someone were to discriminate against me 
based on my [race/weight], that would have 
negative social consequences for me. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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2. It would be stressful for me to be a target of 
someone’s prejudice based on my 
[race/weight]. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Being a target of prejudice based on my 
[race/weight] would make it harder for me to 
achieve my goals. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
